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A REPUTATION TO UPHOLD: MARYLAND COURTS AND THE 
CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF REIT LAW 
SPENCER C. EBACH* 
Just as Delaware is known for articles of incorporation,1 Maryland is 
known for Real Estate Investment Trusts2 (“REIT” or, collectively, 
“REITs”).3  REITs are entities that own income producing properties—of 
which eighty percent of the public-traded variation are based in Maryland4—
and they offer investors the ability to invest in tax-favored diversified 
portfolios of real estate assets that provide returns historically competitive 
with stock indices.5  Critical to Delaware’s reputation, the Court of 
Chancery—the State’s court of equity specializing in corporate litigation6—
has provided a rich and detailed body of case law that has helped the state 
bolster and maintain its status as the preferred state in which to incorporate 
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 1. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Delaware’s Peril, 80 MD. L. REV. 59, 61 (2020) (explaining that 
“Delaware accounts for the bulk of incorporations by publicly traded firms”); Christopher M. 
Bruner, Leveraging Corporate Law: A Broader Account of Delaware’s Competition, 80 MD. L. 
REV. 72, 74 (2020) (“[E]mpirical studies have concluded that Delaware faces little meaningful 
competition among U.S. states when it comes to attracting incorporations . . . .”).  
 2. REITs are companies that own and often operate income-producing real estate or related 
assets, including office buildings, shopping malls, apartments, hotels, resorts, self-storage facilities, 
warehouses, and mortgage loans.  They do not develop property for sale, but instead buy and 
develop primarily to operate them as part of an investment portfolio.  Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs), INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-
basics/investment-products/real-estate-investment-trusts-reits (last visited Apr. 24, 2021). 
 3. Natalie Sherman, For Some Businesses, Maryland is Actually Very Friendly, BALT. SUN 
(Sept. 4, 2015, 6:30 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-reit-haven-20150904-
story.html.  
 4. James J. Hanks, Jr., Federally Tax-Qualified Real Estate Investment Trusts Formed Under 
Maryland Law, NAREIT, 
https://www.reit.com/sites/default/files/FederallyTaxQualifiedRealEstateInvestmentTrustsFormed
UnderMarylandLawbyJamesJHanksJr11-24-15.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2020). 
 5. What’s a REIT (Real Estate Investment Trust)?, NAREIT, https://www.reit.com/what-reit 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 6. See Kahan, supra note 1, at 63 (describing the Court of Chancery as a “de facto specialized 
corporate court”). 
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new businesses.7  As the nation’s leader in REIT formation, Maryland plays 
an essential role in the development of legal rules and standards for REIT 
management and administration.  Though the state’s reputation in the REIT 
field is based in the state’s statutory law, to maintain that role and lead the 
development and administration of REIT laws across the country, Maryland 
needs a strong and experienced judicial mechanism.  In the mold of 
Delaware’s Court of Chancery, Maryland should sanction a REIT-specific 
judicial body of expertise within the state’s court system.  This judicial body 
should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over REIT litigation to centralize the 
state’s case law and influence for posterity.  Though the procedures and 
structure of such a judicial body may bear little resemblance to the world’s 
foremost corporate-centric judiciary, the profound and long-lasting influence 
the Court of Chancery has wielded in Delaware provides a blueprint that 
Maryland should aspire to emulate. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Mirroring Delaware’s own corporate law history, Maryland’s place in 
REIT law is based on a strong and attractive statutory scheme dictating the 
rules and procedures for formation and operations.  However, Maryland does 
not have a judicial system comparable to Delaware’s.  The Court of Chancery 
has been Delaware’s primary judicial body for corporate legal disputes since 
the state became an early adopter of general corporation statutes.8  Since the 
passage of Title 8, Chapter 1 of the Delaware Code, the court has provided a 
rich and detailed body of case law that has helped the state bolster and 
maintain Delaware’s reputation as the preferred state in which to incorporate 
new businesses.9  Built on the foundation of an attractive incorporation 
statute, the relationship between that statute and the state’s corresponding 
case law has reinforced the importance of Delaware to the nation’s corporate 
business structure.  Section I.A will discuss the development and text of 
Maryland’s statutory REIT laws.10  Then, Section I.B will explore the 
                                                          
 7. See supra note 1.  
 8. Delaware passed the General Corporation Law in 1899.  S. Samuel Arsht, A History of 
Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1976).  Though not the first state to pass an 
incorporation statute particularly friendly to corporate interests, Delaware stepped into place after 
then-New Jersey Governor Woodrow Wilson took measures to severely limit the powers of trusts 
and corporations under state law in 1913.  Id.  A number of factors likely contributed to Delaware’s 
subsequent assent to its position as the home of incorporation, but New Jersey’s reforms cleared the 
path for a state, especially one close to New York at the turn of the century, to pick up where it left 
off.  Id.; see also Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 
1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 271 (1976) (describing the history and evolution of Delaware’s 
incorporation statutes). 
 9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101–398 (2021). 
 10. See infra Section I.A. 
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litigation of REIT cases in Maryland and the role different courts play in that 
process.11  Section I.C will discuss the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 
reputation and influence in corporate law, particularly with respect to its 
appeal for those businesses looking to incorporate.12  Lastly, Section I.D will 
describe notable Delaware Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme Court 
decisions and their significance on the corporate landscape.13 
A. Maryland’s REIT Law 
Maryland’s REIT law originates in Title 8 of the Corporations and 
Associations article of the Maryland Code.14  Much like Delaware, the 
attractive statutory provisions within Title 8 were a primary catalyst for 
Maryland’s reputation as the state in which to form REITs.15  These 
provisions were adopted shortly after federal legislation was signed into law 
by President Eisenhower sanctioning the formation of REITs to facilitate the 
“widely dispersed public ownership of real estate in the United States.”16  
Most importantly, these new investment vehicles were created with the 
intention that they would receive preferential tax treatment.17  To this day, 
REITs are still not required to pay corporate income tax as long as they 
distribute at least ninety percent of their taxable income to shareholders.18  
Maryland’s Title 8 itself expanded directly on the federal rules, 
operationalized through the Internal Revenue Code, and three years later the 
Maryland legislature enacted a statute “providing for a separate, free-
standing vehicle at state law, known as a real estate investment trust, to take 
advantage[] of the new REIT provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.”19   
At that moment, Maryland was on the cutting edge of REIT law, one of 
the very first states to embrace the new investment vehicle, just as Delaware 
was an early leader in developing a “liberal” incorporation statute that 
attracted new businesses at the turn of the twentieth century.20  The statute is 
particularly attractive to new trusts because of the protections it provides for 
investors.  Title 8 codifies provisions validating the REIT share ownership 
                                                          
 11. See infra Section I.B. 
 12. See infra Section I.C. 
 13. See infra Section I.D. 
 14. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 8-801 to 8-901 (West 2020). 
 15. Heather Harlan, REITs Find a Comfortable Home in Md., BALT. BUS. J. (Mar. 27, 2000, 
12:00 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/stories/2000/03/27/story4.html. 
 16. James Hanks & Sharon Kroupa, Why Maryland is the Favored Jurisdiction for Forming 
REITs, CSC GLOBAL (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.cscglobal.com/service/webinar/maryland-reit-
dominance/; 26 U.S.C. §§ 856–859. 
 17. Hanks & Kroupa, supra note 16. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Seligman, supra note 8, at 271. 
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and transfer limitations outlined in the Code’s 5/50 Test.21  One of the key 
structural features of REITs, this test prohibits more than fifty percent of a 
trust from being held by five or fewer individuals.22  Title 8 further provides 
REIT shareholders with broad liability protections, flexible voting 
provisions, relaxed bylaw amendment provisions, easy stock issuance 
procedures, and protections against hostile takeovers.23 
With respect to hostile takeovers, maneuvers activist investors often 
deploy against the wishes of public companies’ management teams, 
Maryland law “provide[s] some support for the use of an excess share 
provision to deter a coercive bid.”24  This type of provision is a particularly 
fruitful benefit of the 5/50 test, wherein, “any shares acquired by a 
shareholder in excess of the ownership threshold are stripped of excess voting 
rights or any right to receive dividends until the excess shares are transferred 
to a holder who can own them without violating the ownership restriction.”25  
Furthermore, Maryland’s “control share and fair price statutes and the 
constituency provisions in the Maryland Unsolicited Takeover Act permit 
directors . . . to consider the interests of the corporation’s shareholders, 
employees, customers, creditors, suppliers and communities in which the 
corporation is located or does business.”26  The key point in these ownership 
and equity transfer limitations is that they may be used to protect the tax 
status of the REIT against takeovers, among other enumerated protections.27  
With the statutory codification of the 5/50 test, Maryland has put into law 
specific protections against both hostile takeovers and proxy contests with 
provisions making it particularly difficult to accumulate controlling 
shareholder positions.28  Just as Delaware’s status in incorporation is related 
to its business-friendly statutory structure, Maryland’s REIT provisions 
provide statutory language friendly to the interests of those forming REITs 
for either residential or commercial purposes.29 
                                                          
 21. See 26 U.S.C. § 856(h) (stating that a real estate investment trust may not be closely held 
in accordance with § 542(a)(2)’s requirement that at any time during the last half of the taxable year, 
more than fifty percent of the entity’s outstanding stock cannot be owned by not more than five 
individuals). 
 22. Hanks & Kroupa, supra note 16. 
 23. Harlan, supra note 15. 
 24. David M. Einhorn, Adam O. Emmerich, Robin Panovka, William Savitt & David B. Silva, 
Hostile Takeovers of REITs 49 (Samuel Zell & Robert Lurie Real Est. Ctr., Working Paper No. 
539). 
 25. Id. at 48. 
 26. Id. at 53. 
 27. Hanks & Kroupa, supra note 16. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Jamie Smith Hopkins, Md. REIT Returns 329% in 5 Years, BALT. SUN (Jan. 8, 2004), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2004-01-08-0401080171-story.html (noting 
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B. REIT Litigation in Maryland Courts 
Currently, Maryland lacks a court or judicial body with specific and sole 
responsibility to hear REIT cases.  The Maryland Court of Appeals, the 
state’s highest court, considers many important and contentious legal issues, 
but when hearing critical cases about REITs, the court’s judges do not have 
the benefit of subject matter expertise.  These proceedings often turn on 
matters related to executive duties and protections for shareholders, such as 
Oliveira v. Sugarman,30 in which the court clarified the standard under the 
business judgement rule applies when a disinterested and independent board 
of directors decides to deny a shareholder litigation demand.31  Maryland 
courts maintain a high degree of deference to corporate board decisions in 
shareholder disputes, an appealing feature of the state’s business law 
environment to those forming new businesses.32 
In addition, the Maryland legislature organized the Maryland Circuit 
Court Business and Technology Case Management Program, a small group 
of judges at the circuit court level who receive special training to hear certain 
business-related cases.33  The program has heard a number of REIT-related 
cases, litigating issues of board activity,34 duties between parties,35 and trust 
                                                          
Maryland-based REIT had “pulled off the highest five-year shareholder return among the nation’s 
21 office real estate investment trusts.”). 
 30. 451 Md. 208, 152 A.3d 728 (2017). 
 31. Id. at 245, 152 A.3d at 751 (holding that when the board of directors of a REIT consists of 
a majority of independent directors who make a decision regarding a transaction or who will appoint 
a special litigation committee to that makes the decision, they do not have a duty to accept a 
shareholder demand with regard to that transaction). 
 32. See Shenker v. Laureate Educ., Inc., 411 Md. 317, 349–50, 983 A.2d 408, 427 (2009) 
(stating that when directors use defensive mechanisms to prevent hostile takeovers, there is no 
higher duty or greater scrutiny than any other acts of directors because the legislative history 
indicates an intention “to reject in Maryland the ‘heightened scrutiny’ imposed on directors of 
Delaware corporations in hostile takeover situations by the Delaware Supreme Court . . . a relatively 
rare rejection in Maryland of Delaware’s acknowledged leadership in . . . corporate law to which 
we and many other states ordinarily look for guidance”); see also Boland v. Boland, 423 Md. 296, 
336, 31 A.3d 529, 548 (2011) (quoting Shenker, 411  Md.  at  344,  983  A.2d  at  424) (stating that 
Maryland’s default standard in analyzing corporate decisions “is the deferential business judgment 
rule, which insulates ‘the business decisions made by the director from judicial review’”). 
 33. See infra Section II.C. 
 34. See In re Nationwide Health Props., No. 24-C-11-001476, 2011 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3, at 
*15 (May 27, 2011) (providing further protections for boards of directors by differentiating the 
application of state statutory law to “cash-out” transactions versus a “stock-for-stock” transaction 
proposed by officers and directors); see also In re Aviv REIT Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 24-C-14-
006352, 2015 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 16, at *13–14 (Mar. 20, 2015) (citing the Nationwide court’s 
holding as a persuasive basis for denying plaintiffs’ action against company directors “for breach 
of [a] duty to maximize shareholder value”). 
 35. Corvex Mgmt. LP v. Commonwealth Reit, No. 24-C-13-001111, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 
3, at *27 (May 8, 2013) (clarifying the duties parties are bound to through REIT bylaws regarding 
arbitration). 
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mergers and sales.36  Although no state court exercises exclusive jurisdiction 
over REITs, decisions made across Maryland’s judiciary effect specific 
provisions of the State’s REIT laws, directors, and shareholders incorporated 
or seeking to incorporate in the state. 
C. The Court of Chancery’s Structure and Influence 
The Court of Chancery built a reputation so formidable that it now 
serves as a leader on both the national and international stages, engaging in a 
decades-long process of self-reinforcement that has created and maintained 
its position in the corporate law world.  Approximately sixty-five percent of 
the Fortune 500, an annual list compiling the largest American companies by 
revenue,37 was incorporated in Delaware as of 2019.38  Effectively the 
nation’s corporate capital, “[f]or at least half a century the Delaware courts 
have been the de facto ‘national’ U.S. corporate law courts.”39  The Court of 
Chancery’s “ability to provide a unique branded customer experience partly 
explains its dominant performance within a high-end market segment 
composed of large, publicly traded firms.”40 
The court had to build its own knowledge and institutional precedents, 
especially given the desire to “quickly [take] over New Jersey’s throne” and 
the incentive to maintain a “first-mover” advantage as the first and perhaps 
most visible state to act, to adequately address problems across the spectrum 
of corporate governance.41  Otherwise, those large, publicly traded firms 
would have turned elsewhere in search of assurance of protection in potential 
litigation.  Both in the United States and abroad, multinational corporations 
present judiciaries with a range of challenging legal issues, including 
corporate governance, mergers and acquisitions, financial procedures, 
compliance, risk management, and other commercial and consumer-related 
matters.  Scholars argue that “[b]y routinely deciding these business disputes, 
Delaware courts—through well-established precedents—influence domestic 
and foreign courts as well as corporate stakeholders worldwide.”42 
                                                          
 36. Frederick v. Corcoran, No. 370685-V, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 5, at *16–17 (Aug. 14, 
2013) (parsing the responsibilities of board members in approving and executing a REIT merger or 
sale under Maryland law). 
 37. Methodology for Fortune 500, FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/franchise-list-page/fortune-
500-methodology-2020 (last visited Jan. 4, 2021). 
 38. DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS: 2019 ANNUAL REPORT STATISTICS (2020). 
 39. Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 220 (2015) (quoting 
John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 
1349 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
 40. Id. 
 41. William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1412 (2020). 
 42. Simmons, supra note 39, at 222. 
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Consider the following statement from Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
delivered in Wilmington, Delaware at the bicentennial celebration for the 
Court of Chancery: 
Corporate lawyers across the United States have praised the 
expertise of the Court of Chancery, noting that since the turn of the 
century, it has handed down thousands of opinions interpreting 
virtually every provision of Delaware’s corporate law statute.  No 
other state court can make such a claim.  As one scholar has 
observed, “[t]he economies of scale created by the high volume of 
corporate litigation in Delaware contribute to an efficient and 
expert court system and bar.”43 
The Court of Chancery has benefited immensely under the “internal 
affairs doctrine,” a conflict of laws principle that “recognizes that only one 
[s]tate should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—
matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and 
its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a 
corporation could be faced with conflicting demands.”44  Many jurisdictions, 
including Maryland, recognize the principles underlying the doctrine as 
primary tools in keeping corporate law matters relegated to their originating 
state.45  Recent litigation patterns “have put pressure on this arrangement” 
with corporate law more often litigated outside of Delaware as the state 
maneuvers to avoid public pushback to rulings that may result in an 
increasing pattern of federalization of corporate law.46  However, “[d]espite 
changes in the underlying [internal affairs] doctrine, Delaware stakeholders 
have continued to draw [a] connection between law and forum . . . and 
commentators argue[] that Delaware successfully attracts incorporations both 
because of the content of its corporate law and because of its expert, 
specialized courts and judges.”47 
Thus, the high volume of corporate litigation in Delaware has proven to 
be a demonstrably valuable resource in the legal field.  Because of the State’s 
prominence in corporate matters and its reliance on “corporate franchise fees, 
which constitute approximately sixteen percent of its revenues,”48 the State 
has an incentive to ensure the quality of its incorporation code and the case 
                                                          
 43. William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-
Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992). 
 44. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). 
 45. See Wilkins v. Thorne, 60 Md. 253, 258 (1883) (“This corporation was created under the 
laws of another State, and it seems to us that all such controversies must be determined by the Courts 
of the State by which the corporation was created.”). 
 46. Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX 
LITIG. 51, 57 (2012). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757, 842 (1995).  
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law surrounding the field.  This incentive exemplifies the idea behind the 
“commitment theory,” whereby Delaware’s commitment to the maintenance 
of a responsive corporate code is tied both to its own expenditures and the 
confidence of the firms incorporated in the State.49  Furthermore, from the 
perspective of those firms reliant on the Court of Chancery in this respect, 
the rich and evolving legal history in Delaware offers positive “network 
effects,” including lower regulatory, information, and compliance costs with 
the process of incorporation.50  With so many issues having been previously 
acknowledged and decided by the Court of Chancery, those looking to 
incorporate a new business in Delaware have a foundational set of principles 
and rules that provide a certainty akin to protections against legal action.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized this phenomenon and its potential results 
in his bicentennial address: 
Perhaps most importantly, practitioners recognize that “[o]utside 
the takeover process . . . , most Delaware corporations do not find 
themselves in litigation.  The process of decision in the litigated 
cases has so refined the law that business planners may usually 
order their affairs to avoid lawsuits.”  As one commentary 
concluded, “[t]ime is the best test of an institution and, over time, 
Delaware’s law has earned respect and emulation.  Such success is 
not dramatic, but the result of careful, conservative, long time 
attention.”  Judicial efficiency and expertise, a well-paid and well-
respected judiciary, innovative judicial administration, courageous 
leadership—these hallmarks of the Delaware Court of Chancery 
provide a fine example of a somewhat specialized state court 
system in action.51 
That efficiency, expertise, and innovative judicial administration has 
empowered the Delaware courts to lead by facilitating equitable outcomes 
across the corporate spectrum.  Judges, especially those on the Court of 
Chancery, are highly specialized in corporate law and are faced with a “large 
number of cases and write numerous opinions that provide a large body of 
data on the meaning of Delaware’s law[,]” achieving what in “modern 
academic parlance [] has been characterized as a network effect—a positive 
externality produced by the large number of corporations incorporated in 
Delaware and litigating in their courts.”52  In addition, the Court of Chancery 
sits without juries, so corporations incorporate in Delaware with the 
                                                          
 49. Id. at 842–43 (citing ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 
14–24 (1993)). 
 50. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1069 (2000). 
 51. Rehnquist, supra note 43, at 354. 
 52. William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing 
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2009). 
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knowledge that any legal disputes related to corporate matters that may arise 
will be heard and decided by these experts in the field.53 
Indeed, there are tremendous advantages to sharing among the already 
large pool of Delaware corporations, as “[l]egal experience from one 
Delaware corporation is readily transferable to another Delaware corporation 
because they operate under a common set of rules.”54  This transfer of 
institutional knowledge reinforces over time, as “[t]he quality of future case 
law depends on the number and diversity of lawsuits brought before the 
courts.  These factors, in turn, depend on the number of firms incorporated in 
the state.”55  As the home of such a rich and varied collection of corporate 
entities, Delaware’s corporate law has thus become tremendously influential 
far beyond its own borders, appealing to lawyers and executives looking to 
do business worldwide. 
D. Important Delaware Precedent 
The Court of Chancery’s decisions have broad influence within the field 
of corporate law. Because so many major corporations are incorporated in 
Delaware, cases within both the Court of Chancery and the Delaware 
Supreme Court apply to businesses with name-brand recognition across the 
Global 2000.56  For example, in Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG57 the Court 
of Chancery found, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, the ability of 
a buyer to terminate a merger based on a post-trial determination that a 
material adverse effect occurred.58  The holding, by virtue of Delaware’s role 
as the home of incorporation for so many major companies, necessitates the 
attention and careful consideration of parties negotiating merger agreements 
or litigating over agreement provisions.  Though the decision would appear 
to indicate that “buyers will continue to bear an extremely heavy burden in 
                                                          
 53. Fisch, supra note 50, at 1096. 
 54. David Porter, Competing with Delaware: Recent Amendments to Ohio’s Corporate 
Statutes, 40 AKRON. L. REV. 175, 177 (2007). 
 55. Id. at 177–78 (Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 556 (2002)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 56. Forbes compiles its “Global 2000 list using data from FactSet Research systems to screen 
for the biggest public companies [around the world] in four metrics: sales, profits, assets and market 
value.”  Andrea Murphy, Hank Tucker, Marley Coyne & Halah Touryalai, GLOBAL 2000: The 
World’s Largest Public Companies, FORBES (May 13, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/global2000/#2f6bcddf335d.  
 57. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d No. 2018-0300-JTL, 
2018 WL 6427137 (Del. Dec. 9, 2018). 
 58. In the case, German pharmaceutical company Fresenius Kabi had signed a merger 
agreement to purchase the U.S. drug manufacturer Akorn, which was followed by a steep decline 
in Akorn’s financial performance which Fresenius cited as a materially adverse effect as they 
withdrew from the agreement.  Akorn, Inc., 2018 WL 4719347, at *39. 
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establishing a stand-alone [material adverse effect] to avoid their obligations 
to close,” it raised a numbers of questions moving forward, including the 
importance of a buyer’s access to information prior to the close of a 
transaction.59  A 2017 case, Shawe v. Elting,60 exemplified a perhaps even 
more dramatic holding by the Court of Chancery, wherein upon finding the 
presence of a deadlock between shareholders and directors, the court 
appointed a custodian to essentially force a sale of TransPerfect Global, a 
massively profitable corporation, to a third party.61  For those involved in 
proxy contests, shareholder activism, and even retail investing, this case 
represented an uncommon and drastic judicial remedy for corporate disputes. 
Prior decisions from the Delaware Supreme Court illustrate the depth 
and relevance of the state’s judicial rulings in shaping corporate law and 
practices within the United States.  In Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.,62 the court held, in a landmark decision, that when a company is 
up for sale, the board of directors has a duty to maximize the value of that 
sale for shareholders’ benefit, changing the scope of directors’ fiduciary 
duties and their approach to their company’s position before the sale occurs.63  
The ramifications of a decision of this magnitude can be long-lasting, with 
directors’ duties heightened in the course of corporate transactions involving 
Delaware corporations and a subsequent judicial history determining when the 
new doctrine will apply.64  The Delaware Supreme Court continues to hear and 
rule on consequential cases, such as KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir 
Technologies Inc.,65 where the court clarified the duty of a company to 
produce emails among its management to stockholders, reiterating the 
importance of maintaining formal corporate records for board-level actions.66  
As Delaware’s corporate law continues to reign influentially both in the 
United States and abroad, the courts will play a central role in the 
                                                          
 59. Douglas N. Cogen, Ken S. Myers, & Stephen M. Fisher, Akorn v. Fresenius: Important 
Practical Lessons from First-Ever Material Adverse Effect, FENWICK (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.fenwick.com/insights/publications/akorn-v-fresenius-important-practical-lessons-
from-first-ever-material-adverse-effect.  
 60. 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017). 
 61. Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 167 (Del. 2017). 
 62. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 63. Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986). 
 64. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring Developing 
Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 331 (2018). 
 65. 203 A.3d 738 (Del. 2019). 
 66. KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs Inc., 203 A.3d 738, 758 (Del. 2019) (addressing a 
demand by a stockholder for corporate books and records, including emails and electronically-
stored information (“ESI”) among management, to allow the stockholder to investigate possible 
wrongdoing, such as the reasons behind amendments to an Investors’ Rights Agreement that 
severely reduced the original rights granted under that agreement). 
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development of rules and standards pertinent to matters relevant to both 
directors and shareholders of corporations. 
II. ANALYSIS 
As the nation’s leader in REIT formation, Maryland plays an essential 
role in the development of legal rules and standards for REIT management 
and administration.  Looking to Delaware, where the relationship between 
the State’s statutory and case law on corporate matters has reinforced the 
importance of the State to the nation’s corporate business structure, Maryland 
has an ideal example to follow.  As the home of a majority of the publicly-
traded REITs in the United States, Maryland has an opportunity to lead the 
development and administration of REIT laws across the country by 
implementing a strong and experienced judicial mechanism.  The creation of 
a REIT-specific judicial body of expertise within Maryland’s court system 
with exclusive jurisdiction over REIT litigation—in the spirit of Delaware’s 
Court of Chancery—can serve as a vehicle for effective REIT administration.  
Section II.A will describe the benefits of modeling a new judicial body after 
the Court of Chancery.67  Then, Section II.B will describe how such a body 
would be formed within the State of Maryland, highlighting specific 
questions lawmakers should focus on.68  Lastly, Section II.C will discuss the 
logistics and functionality of developing a REIT-focused judicial body in 
Maryland through the lens of the currently implemented Business and 
Technology Case Management Program.69 
A. The Benefits of Modelling Delaware’s Court of Chancery 
Maryland’s judiciary, state legislators, and practicing attorneys have a 
vested interest in the continued success of the State’s REIT law 
administration.  The development of a legal structure for REIT law 
procedures and evaluation—in the spirit of Delaware’s continued self-
enforcing success in the corporate field—is critical to Maryland’s long-term 
status as a preferential state in which to form trusts.70  The beneficial 
consequences of the procedures and principles that underly the first-mover 
advantage, internal affairs doctrine, commitment theory, and the 
corresponding network effects of all three would provide forward-looking 
momentum and support for Maryland’s legal infrastructure.  The Maryland 
General Assembly has maintained an interest in the benefits that a pro-
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business environment provides,71 and the favorable, user-friendly REIT 
statutes in place have facilitated positive revenue outcomes for the state.  
Though Maryland, unlike Delaware, does not charge a franchise tax for 
businesses,72 the state does charge fees for filing articles of incorporation and 
other documents pertinent to corporate matters.73  Furthermore, a strong 
reputation in REIT law already provides some support and opportunities for 
Maryland’s legal field, just as Delaware’s status in corporate law, due to the 
Court of Chancery’s role, has bolstered the State’s legal profession.74 
Delaware and Maryland law differ in important respects to those 
evaluating opportunities to incorporate.75  However, the internal machinery 
and posturing of the states’ judicial systems appear to suggest parallel 
structural mandates.  Just as the Court of Chancery benefits from an 
experienced and knowledgeable bench, the Maryland General Assembly has 
placed an emphasis on crafting a “[g]reater efficiency resulting from the 
specialized training and education of judges, clerks, and staff,” seeking to 
deploy modern technologies to streamline the filing and processing of 
cases.76  This efficiency and expertise within Maryland’s courts would lead 
to “[m]ore timely, rational, legally correct, and . . . predictable rulings from 
judges who are better trained[,] educated[,] . . . and comfortable in handling 
these cases.”77  In analyzing business-focused courts across the country, 
commentators note that practitioners emphasize that a “consistency regarding 
judges hearing . . . cases as well as their business sophistication has created 
trust in the system, which they cite as a crucial element to the success of a 
specialized court system.”78  Without a specialized judicial body, Maryland 
                                                          
 71. See infra Section II.C. 
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 73. See STATE DEPARTMENT OF ASSESSMENTS AND TAXATION, FEE SCHEDULE FOR 
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is not in a position to consolidate its influence on REIT law and wield a 
judicial authority akin to the Court of Chancery’s.79  Furthermore, the 
consistently present threat of arbitration and forum selection clauses applied 
in REIT litigation may come to inhibit Maryland’s ability to set standards in 
the field if the state was to lose its reputation as the premier jurisdiction for 
REIT incorporation and public policy.80  Contractual provisions precluding 
questions of REIT law from being litigated in Maryland would undercut the 
state’s vitality to the industry, and a strong, REIT-focused judicial body 
would serve to aid in the prevention of such a situation occurring. 
B. Developing a REIT-Focused Judicial Body in Maryland 
Developing a new, REIT-centric judicial body in Maryland would not 
require a process foreign to state lawmakers.  In 2000, the 421st Maryland 
General Assembly passed House Bill 15, kicking off the process that 
eventually led to the creation and implementation of the Maryland Circuit 
Court Business and Technology Case Management Program with the 
creation of an investigatory task force.81  The program, born out of a 
perception that the state had become anti-business, began operation by late 
2002, suggesting a relatively short lag-time in the creation of a new judicial 
program.82  The task force first heard testimony from business people, judges, 
lawyers, legislators, and representatives of business courts established in 
other states.  And, though there was not a clear consensus on the specifics of 
implementation, it “determined that there exist[ed] a general consensus that 
if rules making Maryland’s courts more efficient and effective [could] be 
drafted, such rules should be adopted.”83 
Critically, the task force emphasized “that the inefficiencies and the 
reductions in the timeliness and quality of judicial decision-
making . . . inevitably result[ing] from advocates with specialized knowledge 
presenting cases to generalist trial judges . . . will grow to a level which is 
intolerable.”84  Consequently, the task force recommended “[s]pecialized 
training and education for those judges with experience in business and 
technology issues, as well as the application of specialized case management 
techniques and technology for the handling of . . . cases.”85 
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C. The Business and Technology Case Management Program 
A relatively new, statutorily sanctioned judicial body for REIT law and 
administration has the potential to be particularly fruitful to the maintenance 
of Maryland’s reputation.  But a still-open question is whether Maryland’s 
Circuit Court Business and Technology Case Management Program fits this 
proposed model.86  In the early 2000s, the General Assembly observed other 
states moving towards specialized business courts that improved efficiency 
and addressed perceptions that business-related cases were unsatisfactorily 
handled.87  They prioritized the creation of a business and technology 
programing in an effort to overcome the perception that Maryland was anti-
business and to encourage technology companies to form and remain in the 
state.88  The task force honed in on the robust growth of cutting-edge 
technologies as making up a vital part of Maryland’s economy, and 
recognized that the potential of a technology court “to specialize in the 
administration of disputes involving complex technology issues.”89  The task 
force ultimately recommended the implementation of a statewide business 
and technology case management program within the existing circuit court 
system, as opposed to the creation of a separate business and technology 
body.90 
The existing Business and Technology Case Management Program 
presents logistical and procedural challenges to its being the state’s REIT-
focused judicial body.  Maryland law does not narrowly dictate the type of 
case that falls within the program’s purview, and the assigning judge is 
instead tasked to determine whether an action presents “commercial or 
technological issues of such a complex or novel nature that specialized 
treatment is likely to improve the administration of justice.”91  The law 
includes a seven-factor list designed to measure a case in determining its 
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suitability for inclusion in the program.92  In addition, the Maryland State Bar 
Association has noted that the program’s efficacy has been hampered by 
issues including the non-uniformity in the program as administered in the 
various circuits, the inconsistency in forms and case management procedures, 
and a lack of coordination of, and accessibility to, information, opinions and 
resources.93 
The case management program has taken measures to provide 
transparency and promote its role in Maryland’s business law landscape, 
listing information and resources on its website.94  There is a “consensus 
among interviewed Judges that there should be required training for new 
[business and technology] judges and then a secondary training piece 
consisting of [the] collaboration of all [business and technology] judges on 
an ongoing basis.”95  However, in building a judicial body with the intention 
of maintaining and growing Maryland’s reputation as the home of REIT 
formation, the current Business and Technology Case Management Program 
best serves as a reference point.  Its development provides a ready example 
for the deployment of a new, free-standing REIT program, perhaps modeled 
after the existing program itself.  The benefits from the Court of Chancery’s 
status in the world of corporate law suggest that Maryland needs a REIT-
focused body.96  Whether through a separate court or a REIT-specific case 
management program integrated into the judiciary, Maryland’s rich statutory 
scheme and case law warrant an apparatus that carries the Maryland REIT 
law brand. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The development of a REIT-specific judicial body of expertise within 
the Maryland court system, in the mold of Delaware’s Court of Chancery, 
would bolster the state’s reputation and ability to shape this niche area of law.  
The benefits to Maryland in developing such a judicial body after the Court 
of Chancery are evident through Delaware’s own success and influence in 
the legal world.97  Furthermore, the formation of a new judicial machine is 
not novel to the state and would not necessitate deviation from standard 
practices.98  Though the Business and Technology Case Management 
Program offers a shining example of the General Assembly’s powers and 
ability to facilitate effective judicial expediency and expertise, it alone does 
not provide the adequate judicial infrastructure necessary.99 
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